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"A	different	kind	of	knowing":	speculations	on	understanding	in	light	
of	the	Philosophy	of	Information		
	
This	is	a	slightly	updated	and	extended	version	of	a	paper	by	myself	and	Lyn	
Robinson,	presented	at	the	9th	Conceptions	of	Library	and	Information	Science	
conference,	Uppsala,	28	June	2016.	It	includes	some	additional	points	raised	in	
discussion	of	the	paper.	
				
Introduction	
	
'This	is	a	different	kind	of	knowing…	It’s	like	understanding,	I	suppose'	
Lyra	Belacqua	in	(Northern	Lights,	Philip	Pullman,	Scholastic,	2011)	
	
Bawden	and	Robinson	(2015)	have	argued	that	library	and	information	science	(LIS)	
should	focus	on	the	promotion	of	understanding,	as	much	as	on	the	provision	of	
information,	and	the	sharing	of	knowledge.	But	there	is	a	lack	of	clarity	and	
consensus,	both	in	general	discourse	and	in	the	LIS	literature,	as	to	what	is	meant	by	
understanding.	This	short	and	speculative	paper	considers	some	philosophical	
approaches	to	understanding,	particularly	those	related	to	Floridi's	Philosophy	of	
Information,	and	based	on	the	general	idea	that	understanding	is,	in	the	words	of	
Pullman's	Lyra,	a	special	kind	of	knowledge.				
Understanding	is	often	associated	in	philosophical	discourse	with	the	hermeneutics	
of	Gadamer,	drawing	on	the	thought	of	Husserl	and	Heidegger,	and	emphasising	
interpretation	of	texts;	see,	in	order	of	accessibility,	Zimmermann	(2015),	Gadamer	
(2008),	and	Gadamer	(2013).	Stock	and	Stock	(2013)	outline	this	approach,	and	its	
relevance	to	information	science	and	information	systems.	We	are	not	seeking	to	
ignore	or	to	contradict	this	approach,	rather	to	suggest	that	there	may	be	an	
alternative	and	complementary	viewpoint.	
	
We	begin	by	noting	that	the	information	sciences	have	commonly	fitted	
'understanding'	into	a	linear	succession,	or	pyramid,	of	concepts,	also	including	data,	
information,	knowledge	and	(sometimes)	wisdom.	In	the	initial	statement	of	this	
model,	Ackoff	(1989)	placed	understanding	as	a	concept	between	knowledge	and	
wisdom,	characterising	it	as	an	'appreciation	of	why'.	The	idea	that	understanding	is	
associated	with	a	form	of	knowledge	sufficiently	deep	as	to	be	able	to	provide	
explanation	is	attractive	as	a	pragmatic	way	of	dealing	with	the	concept.	But	it	has	
been	largely	excluded	from	discussion	of	these	kinds	of	concepts	in	LIS	(Rowley	
2007;	Frické	2009),	while	the	whole	hierarchy	or	pyramid	model	has	itself	been	
criticised	on	numerous	grounds	(Frické,	2009;	Ma,	2012;	Yu,	2015).	It	seems	sensible	
to	look	for	a	more	firmly	grounded	explanation,	and	perhaps	a	definition,	of	the	idea	
of	understanding.		
	
	
Methods	
The	study	is	based	on	a	synthesis	of	philosophical	literature,	found	from	a	selective	
literature	review.	Items	dealing	with	the	concept	of	understanding	from	an	
information-based	or	knowledge-based	perspective	were	identified	from	searches	
on	Web	of	Knowledge,	Library	and	Information	Science	Abstracts,	Philosopher's	
Index	and	Google	Scholar,	and	by	following	references	and	citations.	Close	reading	of	
a	set	of	selected	articles	led	to	a	synthesis	of	concepts.		
		
	
Understanding	in	Floridi's	philosophy	of	information		
To	be	of	value	for	LIS,	as	well	as	to	be	congruent	with	most	pragmatically	useful	
views	of	understanding,	we	suggest	that	such	an	explanation	would	have	to	involve	
the	concepts	of	information	and	knowledge,	and	perhaps	data,	carefully	defined.	A	
philosphically	rigorous	analysis	of	these	concepts	which	treats	them	in	a	way	of	use	
to	LIS	is	Luciano	Floridi's	philosophy	of	information,	and	we	begin	with	this	as	our	
basis.	We	are	not	thereby	ignoring	the	Gadamer/Heidegger	approach	to	
hermeneutics;	rather	seeking	an	alternative,	and	potentially	complementary,	
conception.		
	
Floridi	(2010	and	2011),	as	is	well	known,	defines	information	as	well-formed,	
meaningful	and	truthful	data,	in	his	general	definition	of	information	(GDI).	
Knowledge,	he	regards	as	information	formed	into	larger	units:	'Knowledge	and	
information	are	members	of	the	same	conceptual	family.	What	the	former	enjoys	
and	the	latter	lacks	…	is	the	web	of	mutual	relations	that	allow	one	part	of	it	to	
account	for	another.	Shatter	that,	and	you	are	left	with	a	…	list	of	bits	of	information	
that	cannot	help	to	make	sense	of	the	reality	they	seek	to	address'	(Floridi,	2011,	p.	
288).	The	references	to	accounting	and	making	sense	suggest	that	knowledge	may	
necessarily	have	explanatory	power,	often	associated	with	understanding.	Winograd	
and	Flores	(1986,	p.	30)	also	emphasise	this	link:	'what	we	understand	is	based	on	
what	we	know,	and	what	we	already	know	comes	from	being	able	to	understand'.		
	
More	formally,	Floridi	(2011	chapter	12,	and		2012)	argues	that	information	may	be	
upgraded	to	knowledge	by	being	embedded	in	a	network	of	questions	and	answers	
that	correctly	accounts	for	all	of	the	information	items.	This	is	termed	a	theory	of	
account,	an	idea	going	back	to	Plato,	account	here	meaning	simply	giving	reasons	-	
causal	explanations,	logical	deductions,	didactic	factual	support,	clarification	through	
example	or	analogy,	and	so	on	-	to	link	the	individual	pieces	of	information.	The	
information	items	may	be	assumed	to	be	compatible,	and	to	form	a	coherent	
network,	by	virtue	of	their	conforming	to	Floridi's	GDI.	
	
Does	this	equate	knowledge	with	understanding?	Floridi	is	rather	cautious	here,	
suggesting	that	although	we	would	generally	say	that	Wikipedia	or	a	scientific	
textbook	contain	knowledge,	not	just	information,	'it	seems	that	knowing	requires	
understanding,	or	at	least	that	the	two	are	mutually	related',	and	therefore	
textbooks,	webpages	and	current	artificial	agents	hold	knowledge	extensionally	bit	
not	intentionally,	and	therefore	cannot	be	said	to	understand	(Floridi,	2012,	p.	450-
451).	Understanding,	therefore,	is	a	state	of	a	conscious	entity,	when	it	has	
internalised	knowledge,	which	is	itself	a	collection	of	information	arranged	in	a	
network	of	a	particular	nature,	its	nodes	linked	by	account-giving	interrelations.	This	
is	similar	to	the	viewpoint	espoused	in	Shera's	early	formulation	of	social	
epistemology;	an	individual	person	has	an	emotional	interaction	with	knowledge,	
and	can	therefore	understand	in	a	way	in	a	society	cannot	(Shera,	1970;	see	also	
Furner,	2002)	
		
	
Other	current	philosophical	perspectives	
Floridi's	is	not	the	only	current	philosophical	account	of	understanding	which	relates	
the	idea	to	information	and	knowledge,	and	we	now	examine	some	others.	
	
Jeroen	de	Ridder	(2014)	regards	understanding	as	a	kind	of	higher-order	knowledge,	
in	a	network	of	knowledge	with	internal	coherence	and	explanatory	potential.	
Somewhat	similar	to	Floridi's	conception,	in	its	emphasis	on	an	explanatory	network,	
de	Ridder's	idea	of	understanding	simply	takes	the	concept	of	knowledge	as	a	given,	
and	makes	no	relation	with	information.	
	
David	Deutsch	(1997)	gives	an	explanation,	though	not	a	rigorous	definition,	of	
understanding,	as	distinct	from	knowing,	describing	and	predicting.	He	states	that	
understanding	is	hard	to	define	exactly,	but	it	encompasses	the	inner	working	of	
things,	why	things	are	as	they	are	and	having	coherence	and	elegance;	it	is	about	
deep	explanations	and	simplicity.	Again	there	is	no	direct	relation	to	information,	
but	there	is	a	similar	emphasis	to	Floridi	on	coherent	explanatory	capability.	
	
Jonathan	Kvanvig	(2003)	distinguishes	understanding	from	information,	knowledge	
and	truth.	He	suggests	that	'understanding	requires	the	grasping	of	explanatory	and	
other	coherence-making	relationships	in	a	large	and	comprehensive	body	of	
information.	One	can	know	many	unrelated	pieces	of	information,	but	
understanding	is	achieved	only	when	informational	items	are	pieced	together'	
(Kvanvig,	2003,	p.	192).	The	object	of	understanding	(that	which	is	understood)	is	
not	constituted	as	a	number	of	single	propositions,	but	rather	as	an	'informational	
chunk"'.	He	refers	to	the	grasping	of	the	structure	within	this	chunk	as	an	'internal	
seeing	or	appreciating'	(Kvanvig,	2003,	p.	198).	This	approach	is	able	to	cope	with	
ambiguity,	contradiction,	missing	or	false	information,	and	all	the	other	messy	
features	present	in	real-world	information	collections.	It	is	not	inconsistent	with	the	
typical	pragmatic	understanding	noted	above,	but	it	goes	beyond	it.	It	emphasizes	
that	in	understanding	we	are	always:	(1)	dealing	with	a	large	and	complex	set	of	
information;	(2)	going	beyond	a	simple	ordering	and	enumerating	of	the	contents	of	
that	set;	and,	(3)	gaining	some	holistic	'grasp'	of	the	contents	of	the	set.	This	seems	
to	be	the	sort	of	conception	of	understanding	of	value	for	the	pragmatic	needs	of	
LIS.	There	are	many	similarities	here	with	Floridi's	conception,	but	one	distinct	
difference:	whereas	Floridi	insists	on	that	data	must	be	true	to	count	as	information,	
Kvanvig's	approach	allows	for	contradictions,	and	for	false	information	to	be	
managed	on	the	way	to	understanding.	
	
Adam	Toon	(2015)	takes	understanding	to	be	a	cognitive	state;	understanding	feels	
different	from	just	knowing,	requiring	not	merely	possession	of	information	or	
knowledge,	but	also	an	ability	to	see	or	grasp	the	connections	between	them.	This	is	
reminiscent	of	Floridi's	ideas,	though	Toon	does	not	ground	his	view	in	any	
distinction	between	information	and	knowledge,	writing	of	what	is	to	be	grasped	as	
'relevant	facts	and	theoretical	principles',	'relevant	information'	and	'various	items	of	
knowledge'.	Toon	argues	that	understanding	should	be	seen	as	extended	cognition;	
not	merely	what	happens	in	a	person's	mind,	but	also	involving	real	world	items.	He	
exemplifies	this	with	the	use	of	pen	and	paper,	but	it	is	tempting	to	extend	this	to	
suggest	that	understanding	may	involve	more	complex	information	tools.	However,	
as	Toon	points	out,	having	the	address	of	a	website	of	a	online	course	for	a	subject	is	
not	at	all	the	same	as	understanding	the	subject.		
	
Christoph	Kelp	(2015)	uses	a	knowledge-based	account	of	understanding	to	deal	
with	the	evident	fact	that	there	can	be	different	degrees	of	understanding.	He,	like	
the	other	authors	mentioned	here,	equates	understanding	to	connected	knowledge;	
the	more	comprehensive	and	well-connected	the	knowledge,	the	greater	the	degree	
of	understanding.	While	most	people's	understanding	of	a	topic	will	be	less	than	
maximal,	because	their	knowledge	is	neither	comprehensive	nor	entirely	connected,	
Kelp	suggests	that	we	may	argue	that	someone	understands	something	if	they	can	
perform	a	contextually	relevant	task.	
	
	
Understanding	for	LIS	
Of	the	conceptions	of	understanding	reviewed	above,	only	Floridi's	is	rooted	in	
carefully	defined	ideas	of	data,	information	and	knowledge.	Since	this	approach	
seems	the	most	appropriate	and	acceptable	for	the	LIS	context,	we	suggest	that	
Floridi's	philosophy	of	information	could	be	used	as	the	basis	for	a	conception	of	
understanding	suitable	for	LIS.	
	
However,	Floridi's	networks	of	well-formed,	meaningful	and	truthful	information	
seem	at	first	sight	perhaps	too	idealistic	for	the	situations	encountered	in	LIS.	In	
particular,	the	veridicality	requirement	seems	onerous.	We	know	that	much	
information,	even	the	best	information	to	hand	at	any	time,	is	not	necessarily	true.	
Even	scientific	theories,	often	held	as	the	most	reliable	form	of	our	knowledge,	are	
open	to	correction	and	improvement.	This	was	the	point	made	by	Karl	Popper,	when	
he	insisted	that	his	World	3	of	objective	knowledge	must	encompass	error	and	
contradiction	(Popper,	1979).	We	may	follow	Floridi's	terminology	in	seeing	
information	science	as	dealing	with	'semantic	content',	itself	composed	of	
information	(true),	misinformation	(false)	and	disinformation	(deliberately	false).	
However,	this	is	not	how	most	of	those	involved	in	the	information	disciplines	would	
naturally	regard	the	contents	of	their	collections.		
	
For	this	reason,	Kvanvig's	conception	of	information,	with	its	acceptance	of	the	
intrinsic	messiness	of	most	bodies	of	knowledge	encountered	in	the	real	world	
seems	more	in	line	with	Popper's	ideas,	and	hence	more	helpful	for	LIS.	What	is	
needed,	it	seems,	it	a	reconciliation	of	the	ideas	of	Floridi	and	of	Kvanvig,	in	
providing	an	account	of	understanding	helpful	for	LIS.			
	
This	may	be	approached,	we	suggest,	by	adapting	the	ideas	of	Kelp	on	degrees	on	
understanding.	Where	Kelp	takes	the	comprehensiveness,	and	the	extent	of	
connectedness,	of	knowledge	as	the	criteria	for	degree	of	understanding,	we	may	
add	truthfulness	as	a	third	criterion.	Thereby,	complete	understanding	is	
characterised	by	a	collection	of	information	which	is	comprehensive,	optimally	
connected,	and	entirely	truthful;	when	any	of	the	three	criteria	are	less	than	a	
maximum,	the	degree	of	understanding	is	thereby	reduced.					
	
Finally,	we	adapt	Floridi's	categorisation	of	understanding	as	a	state	of	a	conscious	
entity,	by	adding	Toon's	recognition	that	it	may	be	enhanced	and	extended	by	
availability	and	use	of	information	tools	and	systems.	
			
We	are	therefore	able	to	propose	a	tentative	account	of	understanding,	to	be	of	
value	for	LIS	as	follows:	
	
Information	is	taken	to	be	well-formed,	meaningful,	truthful	data.	Knowledge	
is	taken	to	be	information	organised	in	a	network	of	account-giving	inter-
relations.	Understanding	occurs	when	a	conscious	entity,	supported	as	
necessary	by	information	systems,	appreciates	the	totality	of	a	body	of	
knowledge,	including	its	interconnections.	The	extent	to	which	the	
knowledge	is	incomplete,	contradictory	or	false	determines	the	degree	to	
which	understanding	is	less	than	complete.	
	
While	this	account	is	not	formally	stated,	it	does	seem	to	satisfactorily	reconcile	the	
perspectives	of	Popper,	Kvanvig	and	Floridi,	in	a	way	which	should	prove	acceptable	
for	the	pragmatic	purposes	of	LIS.	It	also	poses	a	useful	counterpoint	to	the	
hermeneutic	conception,	so	that	the	complementary	nature	of	the	two	could	
usefully	be	examined.	
			
Conclusions	
The	pragmatic	value	of	an	account	of	understanding,	of	the	kind	developed	here,	is	
that	it	may	prove	useful	in	developing	new	generations	of	information	systems	and	
services	which	may	directly	and	explicitly	support	the	gaining	of	understanding.	This	
will	require	systems	which	go	beyond	the	provision	of	facts,	knowledge	fragments,	
and	documents,	and	beyond	the	answering	of	specific	queries	(Bawden	and	
Robinson,	2015).	Development	of	such	systems	will	require	studies	of	the	
information	behaviours	and	practices,	and	the	information	literacies,	associated	with	
the	gaining	of	understanding,	rather	than	simply	the	acquiring	of	information.	A	
careful	formal	account	of	what	we	mean	by	understanding,	of	which	the	tentative	
proposal	presented	here	is	a	starting	point,	is	needed	to	underlie	such	
developments,	and	to	contribute	to	their	success.	This	is	likely	to	require	a	synthesis	
of	the	conception	outlined	here,	based	on	Philosophy	of	Information,	and	the	
arguably	complementary	conception	based	on	hermeneutics.		
	
Post-conference	addenda	
In	discussion	after	the	paper,	it	was	pointed	out	that	different	groups	might	reach	
entirely	different	understandings,	based	on	essentially	the	same	body	of	public	
knowledge;	climate	change	pressure	groups	were	noted	as	an	example	(thanks	to	
Geoffrey	Bowker	for	sparking	this	discussion).	Even	more	dramatically,	conspiracy	
theorists	may	form	entirely	coherent	and	inter-connected	knowledge	frameworks,	
which	have	little	to	do	with	truthful	information	as	generally	understood.	
Maintaining	these	frameworks	of	understanding	seems	to	rely	on	selective	
information	seeking,	and	on	active	avoidance	of	potentially	contradictory	
information,	as	shown	in	the	paper	presented	at	this	CoLIS9	conference	by	Bhuva	
Narayan	and	Medina	Preljevic	on	anti-vaccination	pressure	groups.	It	seems	
reasonable	to	regard	such	an	understanding	as	deficient	compared	with	one	which	is	
able	to	accept	and	consider	all	potential	relevant	information.	Perhaps	a	further,	
fourth,	criterion	for	the	extent	of	understanding;	a	Popperian	commitment	to	
accepting,	indeed	actively	seeking,	potentially	disruptive	knowledge,	which	could	
amend	and	extend	the	framework	of	understanding.		
	
The	question	was	also	raised	as	to	whether	the	kind	of	understanding	outlined	here	
is	necessarily	an	attribute	of	an	individual,	or	whether	it	could	also	apply	to	the	
understanding	of	a	social	group.	It	is	clear	that	the	concept	of	understanding	which	
we	present	here	is	that	of	a	conscious	entity;	an	'inforg'	in	Floridi's	terminology.	
Whether	it	is	appropriate	to	regard	a	group	of	people	as	such	an	entity	seems	
doubtful,	and	therefore	this	is	strictly	an	account	of	individual	understanding.	
However,	where	we	find	groups	defined	by	a	common	knowledge-base,	as	in	the	
socio-cognitive	basis	of	domain	analysis,	it	may	be	reasonable,	and	helpful,	to	apply	
some	of	these	considerations	to	the	understanding	of	the	group	as	a	whole,	
provided	that	we	do	not	imply	that	we	are	dealing	with	a	group	consciousness.	
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